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For many decades now, the classic treatise on international organizations law written by Henry Schermers and 
Niels Blokker has made the observation that ‘there is no strongly established tradition of developing theories 
on international organizations in the land of legal science’.3 And for many decades now, those words have rung 
true: international organizations law is one of those fields of international law where theorization by lawyers 
has been kept to a minimum. 
In contrast, political scientists have contributed many of the leading theoretical insights concerning the 
creation and existence of international organizations. Most students of international organizations accept the 
proposition that in one way or another, international organizations can be studied in terms of principal/agent 
theory, albeit perhaps with a few twists: the principal is by definition collective, and usually represented with 
the agent in the form of a plenary organ.4 Most also accept the proposition that international organizations do 
not so much represent an abdication of sovereignty, but may actually be of assistance in furthering member 
state interests.5 Many students of international organizations accept the proposition that once cooperation is 
established, it might beget further cooperation – a point made, in this general form, by functionalist and neo-
functionalist integration scholars. The role of international organizations in world politics in intensively studied 
by political scientists, especially, though not exclusively, in the rationalist tradition.6 And recent scholarship in 
international relations suggests that contrary to popular thought – popular amongst some international 
relations scholars, that is – international organizations may lead a life of their own, distinct from that of their 
member states, and may even be instrumental in forging new organizations.7  
Much can also be learned from other disciplines. The work of organization sociologists, for example, suggests 
that there might be merit in studying international organizations as consisting not of unitary members but of 
other organizations (i.e. their member states),8 or that international organizations, like other organizations, 
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consist of bureaucracies whose internal dynamics may come to affect the ways in which organizations work.9 
Historians have contributed to our understanding as well recently, for instance by elucidating the work of an 
entity such as the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission10 or, more generally, by providing 
narratives on the emergence of international organizations or by incorporating international organizations in 
their conceptions of world history11 – even if the latter is still surprisingly rare.12 Anthropologists and 
sociologists deploying ethnographic methods have illuminated the internal dynamics and structural relations of 
particular organizations.13 And even philosophers of action have contributed insights in recent years that may 
help us understand international organizations,14 indeed sometimes with international organizations 
specifically in mind.15 
Still, it is fair to say that international lawyers have not contributed too much on the theoretically interesting 
and important questions. And yet, there is quite a bit to reflect on. International organizations have become 
fixed elements of the international legal landscape, in that much law-making takes place by them or under 
their auspices, and much monitoring of international law takes place by international organizations.16 
International organizations can interfere directly in the lives of individuals, whether through sanctions ordained 
by the United Nations17 or in the migration processing centers run by the International Organization for 
Migration.18 They exercise certain powers, some attributed, some implied, and some perhaps even (think of 
the power to conclude headquarters agreements) inherent in ‘organization-hood’.19 They can boast privileges 
and immunities, at least for their ‘official acts’, but how and where to draw the line with unofficial acts remains 
unclear. They can set standards through all sorts of instruments, but the legal effects thereof remain unclear. 
They engage in operational activities, but through mechanisms and legal institutions that remain opaque. And 
their accountability remains a constant source of concern.20 It is not that international lawyers have completely 
bypassed the theoretical questions: over the last decade or so, theoretical interventions have been made and 
further avenues explored involving such topics as the role of international organizations in state-making,21 their 
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role as platforms for deliberative decision-making,22 their role as sites where expert governance is crafted and 
exercised,23 or how their public authority should be seen and evaluated.24 
Much of the theoretical interest in international organizations law can be traced to the puzzle thrown up by the 
realization that organizations increasingly play an important role in the lives of peoples, whether the citizens of 
their member states or third parties, or even the people actually working for them. In both cases, 
developments over the last four decades or so have revealed a serious accountability deficit – the UN’s 
involvement in the Haitian cholera outbreak and the environmental impacts of World Bank dam projects come 
immediately to mind – and it is slowly dawning on the discipline that coming to terms with the accountability 
of international organizations may well presuppose a proper understanding of how organizations are legally 
structured and how the law allows them to operate.25 
Against this background, we thought it might be worthwhile to devote a symposium issue of this Journal to 
theorizing about international organizations law. We have chosen to do so by examining the intellectual history 
of the field. In this symposium, six scholars reflect on the contributions of six other individuals who were, in 
one way or another, key figures in the development of international legal thought – if not necessarily theory – 
about international organizations. Our conceit was that, through a closer interrogation of the writings of these 
individuals, we might gain a greater insight into the evolution of thinking about international organizations, and 
thereby a sense of the range of theoretical approaches that have been and remain possible within the 
discipline. 
Of course, any such selection of individuals can only be incomplete, and to a certain extent arbitrary. 
Schermers and Jenks represent in certain respects the two leading approaches to international organizations 
law as a general project: functionalism (by Schermers) and cosmopolitan constitutionalism (for want of a better 
term to describe Jenks’ approach).26 Paul Reuter is included as an important French voice,27 and because he 
was actively present at the creation of what is today the European Union. Louis Sohn was, in all likelihood, the 
most seriously international organization oriented legal scholar of his generation in the US. The works of 
Georges Abi-Saab sound a different voice on the role and impact of international organizations, combining his 
Egyptian background with a wealth of experience as a member of a variety of international tribunals, and 
having long been on the faculty of the traditional training institution for the international civil service, the 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. And then Kelsen because – well, he 
was Kelsen, and although he never wrote much on the law of international organizations as such, his writings 
on the United Nations offer much material for discussion. 
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II. Conceptualizing International Organizations Law 
 
The latter point is actually of some relevance: what does it mean to be writing on the law of international 
organizations? There are many scholars who have addressed the workings of a particular organization (say, 
Jackson on GATT28, or Franck on the UN29), but does that make them international organizations lawyers? Or 
those who address in their long careers one or two isolated aspects of international organizations law, but 
never get round to synthesis and generalization?30 
What complicates matters further is that theorizing about international organizations has largely been left 
implicit, even by those whom we singled out for further treatment. It is clear that someone like Schermers had 
strong ideas (sometimes very strong ideas) about what international organizations are for and how they should 
be approached legally, but it also seems that his approach was mostly based on intuition and an underlying 
ethical conviction. His axioms and postulates and his epistemological assumptions were rarely, if ever, spelled 
out, and most assuredly not in systematic and self-reflective theoretical terms. It is no coincidence that 
Schermers struggled considerably with the problem of reconciling his other strong intuition and ethical 
conviction that human rights were worthy of protection – as Klabbers suggests in his contribution, Schermers 
never managed to reconcile the two in coherent manner. To the extent that more recent work is critical of 
existing approaches, it has had to reconstruct such approaches, as a clear and authoritative theoretical 
statement on the law of international organizations is lacking. This, in turn, creates the curious spectacle of an 
important field of international law without, it seems, a core.31 
There are no doubt solid reasons for the under-theorization of international organizations law. One reason is 
that it is by no means clear what the object of theorization would be, given the difficulty of producing a 
consistent and coherent definition of what an international organization is. This manifests itself in several 
distinct but interrelated ways. First, while there is a widespread consensus that the World Bank, the World 
Health Organization, and the International Olive Council all qualify as international organizations, there is 
considerable uncertainty at the margins. It is by no means a given, for instance, that the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, extra-legal as it often claims to be, should be seen as an international 
organization, even if it has the required organs (including an inactive Court) and politically distinct persona.32 
Likewise, there is uncertainty whether the Conferences of the Parties or Meetings of the Parties set up under 
many multilateral environmental agreements qualify as international organizations, for they seem to have 
been intentionally created as something else. For different reasons, it is not clear (although often assumed) 
that international courts and tribunals qualify: on the one hand, they are typically based on a treaty between 
states, having an organ and enjoying privileges and immunities, but one shudders to think of courts exercising 
delegated powers – such would be difficult to reconcile with the independence of the judiciary. And what to 
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make of the erstwhile General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, set up as an organ-free trade arrangement but 
acquiring some organs along the way?    
Second, international organizations, even those falling within the consensus conception, display a wide variety. 
The notion may include public purpose organizations (the classic public international unions) such as the World 
Health Organization or the Universal Postal Union. It may include military alliances such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and earlier Warsaw Pact, although not everybody was convinced the latter would 
qualify, seeing as it was dominated by a single member states33 (one might say much the same about NATO, 
incidentally). It may include the financial institutions, which stand out in many respects, for instance on issues 
of legal personality and member state liability. And it may include some organizations which are little more 
than lobbying clubs for member states from a particular region of the world (think European Union), ideologies 
(think Organization of Islamic Countries), or interests (think Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). All 
these may share some formal characteristics, but otherwise have fairly little in common. 
Third, the two international organizations that most people will immediately think of when they hear the term 
mentioned, the European Union and the United Nations, are not at all representative of the phenomenon. 
Both have an extremely broad jurisdiction and have, at least to some extent, the power to tell member states 
what to do. Neither of those two qualities are very prevalent even when taken in isolation, and the 
combination is well-nigh limited to, precisely, the EU and the UN. 
To put it simply, all this means that a theory relating to international organizations would have to be general 
enough to cover all possible entities, ranging from the European University Institute (also set up as an 
international organization) via the World Meteorological Organization to the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank, and that alone is a nigh-on impossible task. But in addition, it is not even clear what a theory of 
international organizations law would be a theory of. Would it address the role of international organizations in 
their political or social or economic environment (their ‘ecology’)? If so, what would this environment consist 
of: the member states, or also third parties? If member states, would it also cover their citizens? If third parties, 
also third parties other than states? The question is not merely an academic conceit, but can be pivotal on the 
ground, for instance on assessing accountability. There can be no doubt that the World Bank (for instance) is 
accountable to its member states, but its accountability is not limited to those member states alone. It would 
seem sensible simultaneously to claim that the Bank is also accountable to those affected by its actions – the 
poor and dispossessed in the countries where it operates.34   
All this suggests that theorizing about the law of international organizations can and should take a diversity of 
forms and aim to answer a number of different questions, ranging from grand expectations about the role of 
international organizations in global affairs and their impact on domestic policies to more detailed questions as 
to how organs within the same organization stand in relation to each other, or the minutiae of what it means 
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III. To Conclude 
 
The articles assembled in this Symposium reflect this wealth of different approaches. Perhaps the most self-
consciously aimed at trying to understand the workings of international organizations law in general are the 
contributions by Klabbers (on Schermers) and Sinclair (on Jenks). In her contribution on Reuter, Evelyne 
Lagrange brings the international organizations lawyer to legal practice, in this case the practice of helping to 
set up what became the European Union. Ian Johnstone finds elements of both functionalism and 
constitutionalism in the work of Louis Sohn, and argues that deliberative decision-making is the closest Sohn 
comes to providing for accountability in the institutional edifice of ‘world peace through world law’ that he 
seeks to construct. Umut Özsu’s contribution is best characterized as reflexive intellectual history, commenting 
on and drawing inspiration from Abi-Saab’s writings on the workings of the UN in a particular situation of crisis. 
Jochen von Bernstorff studies Kelsen’s work on the UN more generally, and in doing so provides a glimpse into 
what legal theorizing on international organizations could look like, although it is by no means certain that 
Kelsenian insights on the UN could easily be applied to other international organizations. And that, in a 
nutshell, confirms one of the great challenges for any theory of international organizations law: how to 
harmonize such a wide and wild variety of different creatures – how to achieve ‘unity within diversity’. 
Diversity in approaches notwithstanding, readers of this Symposium will immediately notice a distinct lack of 
diversity in both subjects and contributors. In particular, none of the individuals on which these articles focus 
are women. Nevertheless, as Editors of the Symposium we have struggled with the lack of diversity from the 
start. In part, the subject-matter of the Symposium can be explained by the regrettable fact that international 
legal thought about international organizations – like many other fields in international law, as well as other 
disciplines – was for a long time dominated by men. To be sure, there have been important voices on aspects 
of international organizations: one thinks immediately, for example, of Rosalyn Higgins’ well-known work on 
the United Nations, although that work is arguably more concerned with how states have formed general 
international law within the political organs of the UN than the development of international organizations law 
specifically.35 There were also other, less well known, women who wrote more directly on international 
organizations law in the early years of the field, but the fact remains that they were less influential on the 
development of the field, much to the detriment of the field. There is probably no better illustration than the 
work of Felice Morgenstern, whose mid-1980s study of international organizations in their environment 
anticipated current discussions by at least three decades. And yet, her work is rarely cited in recent work on 
the relations between organizations and the world around them – her influence on the discipline has been 
marginal, at best.36 Morgenstern ended her book with a telling analogy: “In some ways the position of 
international organizations in international law is reminiscent of the status of women in national law”, and 
explaining that “[i]nertia, far more than active resistance, is an obstacle to adaption of the law…”.37 Surely, she 
would not have been surprised that in scholarship too, inertia plays its role. 
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